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Abstract
We show that all proofs of Bell-type inequalities, as discussed in Bell’s well known
book and as claimed to be relevant to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type experiments, come
to a halt when Einstein-local time and setting dependent instrument parameters are
included.
We have criticized in previous work [1]-[4] the various proofs of Bell-type inequalities as
given in [5], [6]. Other authors have put forward related criticism of which we quote only
some of the latest publications [7]-[9]. A very interesting discussion has developed during
the last year [10]-[14]. In the present paper we concatenate our arguments into what we call
“row” and “column” arguments. These arguments contain reasoning that is essential to any
Bell-type proof. As we show, these arguments can not be completed when setting and time
dependent instrument parameters are involved. This conclusion is obtained independently
of our previous paper where we derive the quantum result [3]. We first review the parameter
space introduced by Bell and our extension of this parameter space. We use a notation that
is close to our previous papers [1]-[4]. However, for reasons of clarity we capitalize here all
random variables and use the lower case for the values these random variables can assume.
Bell’s [5] parameter random variables are essentially given by the functions Aa(Λ) =
±1, Bb(Λ) = ±1 that are related to the possible outcomes of spin measurements, with Λ
being a parameter random variable that is related to information carried by the correlated
particle pair that is sent out from a common source to two stations S1 and S2. We assume
with Bell and others that the way Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)- experiments are per-
formed guarantees that Λ is independent of the instrument settings a,b. The form of the
experiment was proposed originally by Bohm and Hiley [15].
We extend this parameter space [1]-[4] by adding setting and time dependent instrument
parameter random variables Λ∗
a,t specific to station S1 and Λ
∗∗
b,t to station S2. These variables
may be stochastically independent of Λ. As an illustration, these variables Λ∗
a,t, Λ
∗∗
b,t can be
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thought of being generated by two computers with equal internal computer clock time but
otherwise entirely independent. The variables could be represented by any programs that
evaluate the input of a, t etc. We do not claim knowledge of any mathematical properties of
these parameters as dictated by physics nor do we claim that they must exist in nature. We
can currently not simulate the EPR experiment on such computers and never have claimed
that we can. However, we postulate that any proof of Bell-type inequalities that claims
relevance to locality questions must pass the test to be able to include such parameters.
These parameters do obey Einstein locality and, therefore, must be covered by any EPR
model that is constructed like Bell’s and has the same purpose.
Such parameters require a setting and time dependent joint probability distribution
ρs(Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t,Λ) (1)
The subscript s of ρ indicates the setting dependence. The setting and time dependent
parameter random variables Λ∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t may be stochastically independent of Λ. Bell and all
his followers exclude such parameters since they all have only one probability distribution
ρ(Λ) that does not depend on any setting. The instrument parameters that they do include
are assumed to be conditionally independent given Λ i.e. if instrument parameters are
included, then they have a product distribution (see [5] pp36):
ρs(Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t|Λ) = ρ1(Λ
∗
a,t|Λ) · ρ2(Λ
∗∗
b,t|Λ) (2)
Because we consider time correlations, Eq.(2) cannot hold for our setting and time dependent
instrument parameters. Thus Bell-type proofs exclude a large set of joint probability distri-
butions from their considerations. In the remainder of the paper, we deal with the question
whether Bell-type proofs can be reformulated to include such setting and time dependent
random variables. The answer will be in the negative.
Why were such instrument variables not considered? In our opinion because there was
the belief that the requirement
Aa = −Ba (3)
could not be fulfilled if correlations other than those given by Λ would be invoked. In
fact, Bell himself writes on p 38 of [5] that for the case that Eq.(3) holds, “the possibility
of the results depending on hidden variables in the instruments can be excluded from the
beginning.” Bell clearly did not consider the possibility of time correlations such as
Aa(Λ,Λ
∗
a,t, tmeas.) = −Ba(Λ,Λ
∗∗
a,t, tmeas.) (4)
where the measurement times tmeas. in the two stations are, for the same correlated pair,
either the same (as indicated above) or at least linearly related and therefore can lead to
Eq.(4) which is equivalent to Eq.(3) .
Can Bell-type proofs be saved by some reasoning in the extended parameter space? We
show below, that all Bell type proofs contain what we call “row” and “column” arguments
that can not be completed for the extended parameter space. We first consider a prototype
of Bell’s original proof arranged according to two types of reasoning (row and column):
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(b1) The row argument of Bell:
For x, y, z = ±1 we have
|xz − yz| = |x− y| = 1− xy (5)
Substituting x = Ab(Λ), y = Ac(Λ) and z = Aa(Λ) gives
|Aa(Λ)Ab(Λ)− Aa(Λ)Ac(Λ)| = 1− Ab(Λ)Ac(Λ) (6)
(b2) The column argument of Bell: using the inequality
|
∫
f | ≤
∫
|f | (7)
and the assumption that ρ is a probability density independent of the settings, we
obtain
|
∫
(Aa(Λ)Ab(Λ)− Aa(Λ)Ac(Λ))ρ(Λ)dΛ| ≤ 1−
∫
Ab(Λ)Ac(Λ)ρ(Λ)dΛ (8)
In view of the definition of the expectation value for the spin pair correlation E(Aa·Bb),
this yields Bell’s inequality.
Does Bell’s proof go forward when setting and time dependent instrument parameter
random variables Λ∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t are included?
(hp1) The row argument with setting and time dependent instrument parameters leads to:
|Aa,t1(...)Ab,t1(...)− Aa,t2(...)Ac,t2(...)| =? (9)
one can see immediately that inclusion of a time index that is related to the actual
time of the measurement does not permit completion of Bell’s reasoning as used in
Eq.(6).
(hp2) The column argument with setting and time dependent instrument parameters:
Eq.(8) is based on the row argument expressed by Eq.(6). Because Eq.(6) can not be
derived when our instrument parameters are included, the column argument can not
be completed as well. In addition, the integration performed in Eqs.(7) and (8) in-
volves now three different joint probability distributions and corresponding probability
measures µ. Consequently, a fortiori, the integration does not lead to the inequality
expressed in Eq.(8) and to Bell’s inequality as can be seen by considering the following
integrals on the left side of Eqs.(8):
|
∫
Aa,t1(...)Ab,t1(...)dµ(Λ,Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t)−
∫
Aa,t2(...)Ac,t2(...)dµ(Λ,Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
c
)| =? (10)
3
Although this shows already clearly why Bell-type proofs do not go forward with time
and setting dependent instrument parameters, we will repeat our reasoning more extensively
by discussing tables of possible outcomes for the random variables which is a frequently used
argument in proofs of Bell’s inequality. We start again using only the parameter space of
Bell.
(bt1) The row and column argument of Bell for tables of possible outcomes.
It is common practice [6] to form and discuss tables of possible outcomes that, invari-
ably, involve in each row a certain sum of terms that we denote by ∆:
∆ = Aa(Λ)Bc(Λ)−Aa(Λ)Bb(Λ)−Ad(Λ)Bb(Λ)−Ad(Λ)Bc(Λ) (11)
At this point the following statistical argument is usually invoked in one form or an-
other. If one considers possible outcomes λi that the random variable Λ may assume,
then by the strong law of large numbers the values λi will appear approximately the
same number of times for each of the setting pairs since these occur with the same
probability. The reason for this argument is that the source parameter Λ does not
depend on settings. However, this argument works only if the cardinality of the set
{λi} of values that Λ can assume is much smaller than the number of experiments
performed. If all this is fulfilled, then one can reorder the possible outcomes of Λ in a
thought experiment such that one has rows of four terms with the same value λi for
each element of any given row:
∆i = Aa(λ
i)Bc(λ
i)− Aa(λ
i)Bb(λ
i)− Ad(λ
i)Bb(λ
i)− Ad(λ
i)Bc(λ
i) = ±2 (12)
Note that this possibility of reordering makes it unnecessary, at least in principle, to
involve counterfactual arguments i.e. arguments of what would have happened if a
different setting were chosen. One simply argues statistically that Λ will assume the
same values no matter what the setting is and therefore one can reorder to obtain
the table shown immediately below. We will see, however, that no such reordering
is obvious for the extended parameter space and that one does need counterfactual
reasoning to proceed with Bell-type arguments in that extended space. We will also
see that mere counterfactual reasoning that still might be admissible is not sufficient
to complete the Bell-type proofs. Because the above equation is true for each row, no
separate column argument is needed to derive Bell-type inequalities. One can write out
the following table and state: within Bell’s original assumptions, the following table is
“sampled” by the experimental procedure of EPR experiments:


λ1
λ2
...
λi
...
λM




+A1
a
B1
c
−A1
a
B1
b
−A1
d
B1
b
−A1
d
B1
c
+A2
a
B2
c
−A2
a
B2
b
−A2
d
B2
b
−A2
d
B2
c
... · · · · · ·
...
+Ai
a
Bi
c
−Ai
a
Bi
b
−Ai
d
Bi
b
−Ai
d
Bi
c
... · · · · · ·
...
+AM
a
BM
c
−AM
a
BM
b
−AM
d
BM
b
−AM
d
BM
c


=


±2
±2
...
±2
...
±2


(13)
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Although the measurements of the various terms can only be made in sequence, at the
end of the day one would have accumulated this table and obtained it by reordering
provided that the element of physical reality that corresponds to a given λi could be
somehow made visible. Of course, there may be some terms left over as implied by the
application of the law of large numbers. However, the number of such incomplete rows
is negligible for large M .
With time and setting dependencies permitted we need to invoke the following table in
an attempt to proceed with reasoning similar to the above:


λ1 t1
λ2 t2
...
...
λi ti
...
...
λM tM




+AaB
∗
c
−AaBb −AdBb −AdBc
+AaBc −AaBb −AdB
∗
b
−AdBc
... · · · · · ·
...
+AaBc −AaB
∗
b
−AdBb −AdBc
... · · · · · ·
...
+AaBc −AaBb −AdBb −AdB
∗
c


=


?
?
...
?
...
?


(14)
Here the asterisk for one term per row is used to indicate that only one pair of settings is
possible at a given time. The question-mark ? on the right hand side replaces now the ±2
for reasons given immediately by discussing row and column arguments. Before doing so we
digress to clarify the meaning of elements of physical reality that are related to the hidden
parameters.
The EPR argument postulates a reality for the parameters or information that come with
the particles from the source. If instrument parameters Λ∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t are introduced, then the
reality of what is measured or the information content of what is measured depends now on
both the information from the source and the information from the instruments in a mixed
way. We are not talking about the reality of the information of the source alone but about
that reality as “seen” through the instruments. That mixed information depends on the
actual macroscopic settings of the instruments a,b etc.. As a consequence this mixed reality
can not exist for different settings at the same time. Therefore, all arguments involving
all of Table(14) are now counterfactual. It is important then to explain how results from
counterfactual arguments can be compared to experiments. Furthermore, one needs to deal
with the fact that only the fraction of Table(14) marked by asterisks does correspond to
possible values that the random variables may assume. Only one value may be assumed in
a row, any second value is impossible, much as a coin toss can give only head or tail but
not both at a time. The quantity ∆, representing a row, is therefore not even a random
variable as can be seen from the textbook definition (P. Halmos): “a random variable is
a function attached to an experiment - once the experiment has been performed the value
of the function is known.” These facts invalidate all Bell-type proofs known to us as can
immediately be seen from the following.
(hpt1) The row argument for tables of possible outcomes with time and setting dependent
instrument parameters:
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The pair of settings that are chosen can be thought of as picked by the throw of a
tetrahedal die. Therefore at a given time only one pair can be picked. Adding or
counting more of the possible (for themselves) outcomes of a row amounts to the same
as adding or counting different possible outcomes for tosses of the tetrahedal die (or
of coin tosses as mentioned above) at a given time. The result of such a procedure is,
in general, bound to be incorrect as can be shown by numerous examples. Therefore,
the row argument does not work and cannot be used to compute the row-sum of ±2
in Table(14).
(hpt2) The column argument for tables of possible outcomes with time and setting dependent
instrument parameters:
Bell-type proofs need to show that the sampling of Table (14) leads to an expectation
value of ∆ that represents essentially Bell-type inequalities. However, ∆ is not what is
necessarily sampled by any procedure commensurate with the experiments as can be
seen from the fact that one has four different integrals for the four expectation values
of the spin pair correlation corresponding to the four columns e.g.
E(Aa·Bb) =
∫
AaBbρs(Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t,Λ)dΛ
∗
a,tdΛ
∗∗
b,tdΛ
or
E(Aa·Bc) =
∫
AaBcρs(Λ
∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
c,t,Λ)dΛ
∗
a,tdΛ
∗∗
c,tdΛ
and similar with other settings that appear in the Bell-type inequalities. Only if the
joint distributions ρs are independent of the setting can the Bell-type inequalities be
obtained the way they are usually proven.
We have thus excluded the main arguments that can be used to prove the Bell inequalities
when time and setting dependent parameter random variables are involved i.e. the row and
column arguments and the argument involving reordering. Below we attempt to shine some
additional light on the failure of these arguments using slightly different viewpoints. It is
important to be clear about the following fact. When time dependencies are included, the
Bell-type arguments become necessarily counterfactual i.e. they involve considerations that
can not be proven by experiment. This follows simply from the fact that any reasoning that
involves considerations of different settings at the same time does not correspond to an actual
experiment because at a given time only one setting of a macroscopic instrument is possible.
The discussions above show also clearly that the technical expression “counterfactual” is, by
itself, not sufficient to describe the extent of its meaning for a proof involving mathematical
logic and deductions thereof. It definitely is still permissible to consider, as Einstein did, the
possibility that a different setting could have been used. Recall Einstein’s original argument:
if setting a is used in station S1 and Aa = +1 then one can predict with probability one
the result Ba = −1 in station S2. Had instead setting b been used in S1 and the result
was Ab = +1, then one can predict with probability one the result Bb = −1 in S2. We
can not see anything wrong in the reasoning of this argument. However, if anyone starts
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adding or subtracting outcomes for settings that could have been chosen, then the result
of such addition may not have any meaning and can be completely nonsensical. A simple
example makes this clear. Consider ordering a meal from the menu in a restaurant. After
the meal, the owner of the restaurant adds possible other choices that you could have made
and presents the bill for all choices. Note, however, that in the standard text-book of
Peres [6] such arguments occur in abundance. For instance on p 167 of [6] the author
reports on “people who ponder over a menu in a restaurant”-“with no apparent ill effects”,
while on p 163 of [6] the author concedes with regard to his Eq.(6.24) that not all tests
can be performed simultaneously. That fact does not prevent the author from totaling up
the “results” of such non-performed experiments in his Eqs.(6.24) and (6.28). We therefore
should name such situations as described above not just counterfactual but, rather “counter-
syntaxial” [16] indicating that the counterfactual argument is compounded by the use of
mathematical operations such as counting, adding, subtracting, etc. in a way that violates
well established protocol. While counterfactual reasoning still may permit to continue with
mathematical logic, counter-syntaxial reasoning invalidates any proof. The row argument
in Bell-type proofs is counter-syntaxial and therefore mathematically inadmissible. What
remains, therefore, is the column argument. In other words, Bell-proof supporters must show
that the counterfactual Table (14) is still sampled in its entirety with high statistical accuracy
because of the fact that a large fraction of the columns is sampled. However, we have shown
above that this argument does not lead to Bell-type inequalities when setting and time
dependent instrument parameters are involved because these imply the existence of setting
dependent joint probability distributions. We have seen, however, in many discussions with
colleagues, that these facts are not recognized because of a circular argument that can be
summarized as follows.
It is often simply being assumed that what is sampled (e.g. in a Monte Carlo integration
sense) by the procedure of random choice of setting, time and Λ is just Table (14), even if time
correlations are involved. Others assume that if one would reorder the measured results one
would invariably end up with a table equivalent to the full Table (14) ignoring the fact that
the measurements are all at different times and that the reordering procedure would require
extensive mathematical proof. Since this Table (14) leads immediately (by trivial algebra)
to the Bell inequalities, the Bell inequalities are then assumed to be proven. This is clearly
a logical circle. The task is to prove that any sampling procedure commensurate with the
experiment or any such reordering procedure indeed gives a table equivalent to Table (14).
That this is not possible by general mathematical methods can be seen from the following
facts. Any sampling procedure that is commensurate with the experiments samples functions
Aa, Bb on a space that includes the respective settings, Λ and Λ
∗
a,t, Λ
∗∗
b,t at time of measure-
ment tmeas.. One can say that one samples the product Aa(Λ,Λ
∗
a,t, tmeas.)·Bb(Λ,Λ
∗∗
b,t, tmeas.)
by choosing randomly values of a,b,Λ,Λ∗
a,t,Λ
∗∗
b,t and tmeas.. Involving reasonable conditions
for the parameters, this is indeed true and the result relates directly to the expectation value
E(Aa·Bb) of the spin pair correlation. To prove the Bell inequalities, however, one wants to
sample ∆ and not just the A.B products. However, ∆ is not randomly sampled, because
each value of ∆ involves four A·B products taken at the same time and with the same Λ
for four different settings while only one term of any row is sampled by the measurement
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procedure. Think of the sampling as a Monte Carlo integration procedure. To sample ∆,
such an integration scheme must include random choices in any given row including two,
three or four elements at the same time with the same value that Λ may have assumed and
for different settings. However, only one such element is sampled per row. This problem
is compounded by the fact that each column contains different stochastic variables that are
setting dependent and follow different joint distributions. From this one can see that ∆ is not
sampled. Nor can we see any procedure of reordering that would map any possible outcomes
that correspond to actual measurements onto Table (14). This brings home the importance
of the definition of a random variable and the importance to adhere to that definition when
probability theory is used. According to this definition, ∆ is not a random variable and
Bell-type proofs are therefore mathematically questionable in general. They become invalid
when time and setting dependent instrument parameters are involved.
One can now ask the question whether there can be any other proof of the Bell-type
which can deal with setting and time dependent instrument parameters. We have attempted
to answer this question in reference [3] and we point the reader to this reference. There we
show, that for any random sequence of setting pairs (that appear in the Bell inequalities)
there exists a distribution of local setting and time dependent instrument parameters that
leads to the quantum result for the expectation value E(Aa·Bb) of the spin pair correlation.
This model shows therefore that one can construct joint probability distributions that do
not lead to Bell type inequalities and that ∆ is not necessarily sampled by the experimental
procedure. Therefore, assuming the validity of the results given in [3] , no Bell-type proof
can be given because such proofs always need to show that ∆ is sampled by the experimental
procedure if the parameters involved obey Einstein locality. The discussion between Einstein
and Bohr would then be undecidable by a probability model of the type that Bell suggested.
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1-0604.
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